On the Ontological Roots of the Possible Worlds Discourse: Leibniz vs Spinoza
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2024
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Abstract
This paper pursues two primary objectives. Firstly, it delves into the origins of the discourse on possible worlds within modern ontology, focusing particularly on the metaphysical perspectives of Leibniz and Spinoza. Secondly, it endeavors to illustrate that despite their divergent metaphysical frameworks, which are diametrically opposed on certain theological issues such as the anthropomorphic conception of God, both Leibniz and Spinoza accommodate the discourse on possible worlds through modal logic. To achieve these aims, the article is divided into two sections. The first section elucidates Leibniz’s utilization of the discourse on possible worlds to proffer resolutions to classical philosophical quandaries, including the problem of evil, the Thrasymachus version thereof, the Euthyphro dilemma, and the problem of sin. The second section scrutinizes Spinoza’s metaphysical framework and, in light of his rebuttals against the anthropomorphic portrayal of God, examines the interplay among concepts such as freedom, necessity, perfection, reality, Natura Naturata, and Natura Naturans. The culmination of this investigation leads to the conclusion that the discourse on possible worlds fundamentally resides within the domain of modal logic. Wherever modal logic finds its application within a given metaphysical framework, the discourse on possible worlds naturally follows suit. The study substantiates this assertion through the contrasting metaphysical paradigms of Leibniz and Spinoza, both of which validate the legitimacy of the discourse on possible worlds. In essence, this study contributes to the scholarly discourse by offering a nuanced examination of the metaphysical underpinnings of the discourse on possible worlds, demonstrating its inherent compatibility with modal logic across divergent philosophical frameworks.